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This thesis examines how having authority to make decisions in different levels of 
an organization affects performance. The homeland security implications of this study are 
that the agencies responsible for homeland security are commonly structured along a 
rigid hierarchy with authorities accumulated at the top. This slow-moving structure is 
compared to more decentralized and flexible organizations found in private industry and 
in some foreign governments. Organizational performance can be predicted by examining 
how the level of operating environment instability is matched to an organization’s 
decision-making authorities. Using case study analysis, coupled with an extensive 
literature review, this thesis concludes that the more turbulent the potential environment, 
such as in the case of a terrorist threat or natural disaster, the more decentralized the 
organizations should be.  
The conclusion recognizes the political reality that Congress and executive 
leaders are not going to easily devolve authority to lower levels in organizations. 
Therefore, the study concludes with recommendations that agencies dealing in uncertain 
and changing environments be more loosely coupled at lower levels, allowing more 
decision-making authority to street-level operators while maintaining ultimate authority 
at upper levels. Finally, the thesis also recommends additional study of decentralizing 
strategies specific to homeland security agencies.  
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In a speech to the American Bar Association in 2011, Deputy Secretary of 
Homeland Security Jane Holl Lute said, “National security is centralized, it’s top-driven. 
Homeland security is operational, it’s transactional, it’s decentralized, it’s bottom 
driven.”1 Despite this acknowledgement that homeland security starts and ends at the 
street level, the organizations responsible for ensuring homeland security were all created 
and continue to be run by highly centralized, top-down directives. This incongruence can 
be a major factor in organizational ineffectiveness. 
Soon after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the entire apparatus for detecting and 
responding to homeland security threats was completely overhauled in an amazingly 
short time. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was formed from 22 existing 
federal agencies, and these agencies were tasked with a wide array of homeland security 
functions in addition to the missions that they were already performing. The intelligence 
services not under the control of the DHS were given new missions and focus as well, 
again without diminishing the existing assignments. In order to facilitate this massive 
reengineering of these agencies in a short time, a top-down approach was used for the 
reassigning and repurposing the organizations. This resulted in hierarchal, highly 
centralized decision making as the norm in these agencies. This thesis examines the 
wisdom of continuing the highly centralized hierarchy of these organizations.  
Setting the proper level of centralized decision making is essential to the effective 
functioning of an organization. This fact is especially relevant to homeland security 
organizations. An all-too-centralized organization is too slow to react to changing 
conditions, while a too-decentralized one may lack accountability or work at cross-
purposes to other parts of the security enterprise.  
Centralized decision making is most appropriate for organizations that operate 
according to well-defined procedures in a stable atmosphere. Stable and well defined are 
                                                 
1 Jane Holl Lute. “Homeland Security Watch: A New Perspective on Homeland Security?” December 
20, 2011, accessed September 22, 2015, http://www.hlswatch.com/2011/12/20/a-new-perspective-on-
homeland-security/. 
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not descriptors used in the homeland security environment. Centralized control is best 
suited for predictable, administrative activities that are a part of any large organization. 
Unfortunately, this level of detailed control often becomes a cultural norm throughout an 
enterprise. Decentralized decision making is better suited to fast-moving or uncertain 
environments characterized by terrorist or natural disaster threats; however, merely 
instructing organizations to decentralize is both impractical and ineffective. 
To be effective, decentralization of decision making must be part of a more 
general cultural shift as well as a part of a properly conceived strategy. In this thesis, 
various strategic archetypes are considered, and the prospector, analyzer, defender, 
reactor typological theory,2 as proposed by Miles et al., is explored in the homeland 
security context. This theory has been shown to be widely applicable to both public and 
private enterprises and to be both descriptive and predictive of performance in multiple 
longitudinal studies. Furthermore, in this thesis, the different typologies are examined in 
the context of best fit for different levels in homeland security organizations. The level of 
centralized decision making is then matched to the typology that is shown to offer the 
best performance.  
This study finds that agencies engaged in the unsettled environments of terrorism 
prevention and disaster response could benefit from a loose coupling of the frontline 
employees engaged in fieldwork from higher levels in the organization that must deal 
with the political realities of tight administrative and congressional oversight. This model 
both accepts the political reality of federal bureaucratic oversight and frees employees 
from overly formalized and cumbersome processes and micromanagement from remote 
sources in the organizational hierarchy. This thesis also recommends that these changes 




                                                 
2 Raymond E. Miles et al., “Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process,” The Academy of 
Management Review 3, no. 3 (1978): 546–562. DOI: 10.2307/257544.  
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Appropriate strategic implementation and centralization affects all aspects of the 
homeland security enterprise in that different agencies have varying responsibilities that 
operate in different environments. For instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
has struggled with transitioning from a criminal investigative agency to one of terrorism 
prevention.1 Strategic typology theory would predict that this transition would not be 
easy based on the current and prospective environments and the strategies that fit each. 
Criminal investigation presents a relatively stable environment that requires action 
following a crime. Terrorism prevention presents a much more dynamic environment that 
requires creativity, innovation, and speed to predict and prevent contemplated actions or 
previously unimagined threats.  
Likewise, such agencies as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
operate day-to-day in a stable environment. In the absence of an emergency, the agency 
offers support to state and local jurisdictions to enhance response capabilities and builds 
internal capabilities to respond to regional or national disasters.2 During an emergency, 
the operating environment goes from very stable to very dynamic. Tierney describes 
disasters as “complex occasions characterized by a high degree of ambiguity, often 
coupled with extreme urgency, that require extensive improvisation and that call for more 
autonomy, rather than less, on the part of organizational entities involved in the 
response.”3 These two situations call for radically different implementation strategies and 
managers may not be able to pivot quickly from a formalized structure to the 
                                                 
1 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2009).  
2 “About the Agency,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, accessed November 1, 2015, 
http://www.fema.gov/about-agency. 
3 Kathleen Tierney, “The 9/11 Commission and Disaster Management: Little Depth, Less Context, Not 
Much Guidance,” Contemporary Sociology 34, no. 2 (2005): 117.   
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decentralized one required during emergency conditions.4 These different environments 
call for different strategic archetypes and consequently different levels of centralization. 
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was 
formed by combining and centralizing the control of 22 separate agencies, each of which 
had a piece of the homeland security puzzle. The inclination of elected officials to 
centralize organizations to make them both easier to manage and easier to assign 
accountability for results is well established.5 The success of any large organization relies 
on the ability of the decision makers effectively to execute the strategic mission that is 
the organization’s reason for existence. As Perrow points out when describing the 
formation of the DHS: 
The institutional framework chosen for protecting homeland security 
followed a cultural script that organizational designers such as Congress 
most easily revert to—namely, centralized control—even though the 
problem would be more amenable to the empowerment of diverse, 
decentralized units.6 
The role of decision making depends on a proper alignment of degree of 
centralization within the organization with its strategy. This alignment must be carried 
down through its strategic business units to allow the organization to function as an 
organic whole. When well-functioning organizations find that they must make either 
strategic or organizational shifts due to environmental or policy changes, a failure to 
consider whether the chosen strategy matches the organizational structure can lead to 
problems that are difficult to diagnose. This thesis assesses whether centralization or 
decentralization leads to better outcomes based on a best fit of strategy for the type of 
organization. The study also examines ways that managers can assess their own agency 
or business unit to determine what type of strategy is being pursued and whether this 
strategy fits with the extant level of centralization and formalization within the unit.  
                                                 
4 E. C. Stazyk, S. K. Pandey, and B. E. Wright, “Understanding Affective Organizational 
Commitment: The Importance of Institutional Context,” The American Review of Public Administration 41, 
no. 6 (2011): 603–24. DOI: 10.1177/0275074011398119.  
5 Charles Perrow, “Disaster after 9/11: The Department of Homeland Security and the Intelligence 
Reorganization,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no 1 (2006): 1–32.  
6 Ibid., 3.  
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Many factors can precipitate change in large organizations, including government 
agencies. Adjustments in strategy, mission, technology, and organizational structure can 
all have profound bearing on how and where an organization conducts its business. A key 
consideration when matching strategy with organizational structure is where the power 
centers of the organization will lie. The power centers of an organization may be defined 
as those people or positions that have the authorities to make non-routine decisions or 
deploy and expend resources. These power loci are often identified by the amount of 
centralization that is built into the structure through authorities and access to resources. 
The level and degree of centralization that the organization applies to resources and 
decision-making authority is a key decision that is often not taken with a level of analysis 
appropriate to the level of influence the decision will have on the ultimate success of the 
organization. 
In 1993, Vice President Al Gore released The National Performance Review 
(NPR), which was the result of a six-month, comprehensive survey of business practices 
within the federal government.7 The final report and appendices spanned 2000 pages and 
contained 384 recommendations and 1250 specific actions that were to be taken.8 This 
study has been described as “one of the most ambitious, far-reaching and thoroughly 
prepared management reform efforts of the twentieth century.”9 One of the central 
findings of the report was that government service had become too centralized, and as a 
result, it had become overly rule-bound, slow, and resistant to innovation. Some of the 
main recommendations of the report focused on decentralizing functions, thus 
empowering middle and lower level managers, and allowing decisions to be made closer 
to the point of customer contact. These actions are widely accepted as means to reduce 
formalization, speed processes and innovation, and eliminate waste by cutting 
unnecessary levels of supervision. 
                                                 
7 Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better & Costs Less. Report 
of the National Performance Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Vice President, 1993), 
http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED384294.  
8 “A Brief History of the National Performance Review,” University of North Texas, accessed April 
30, 2015, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/papers/bkgrd/brief.html. 
9 James P. Pfiffner, “The National Performance Review in Perspective,” International Journal of 
Public Administration 20, no. 1 (1997): 41, DOI: 10.1080/01900699708525188.  
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Seven years after the NPR’s release, an assessment of the impact of the 
recommendations made in the NPR was conducted at the end of the Clinton 
administration. It concluded that with a few notable exceptions, such as eliminating the 
10,000-page federal personnel manual, the larger federal organizations made superficial 
changes to their operations and settled back into the status quo.10 In the prophetic words 
of one senior Office of Personnel Management official in response to the original NPR, 
“This too shall pass.”11 One of the reasons given for the failure of the NPR to make 
significant changes in the way that government does business was a lack of a coherent 
implementation strategy to achieve its stated goals.12  
There are many reasons that are put forward as to why devolving power down in a 
government bureaucracy may not be in the best interest of the agency affected, its 
customers, or the government as a whole. Government organizations do not have a good 
track record of rightsizing themselves to the level of the need or of releasing authority 
and resources once they have been accumulated, even when significant pressure has been 
applied for the organizations to do so. One example of this can be found in a 
recommendation of the Gilmore Commission, which was charged by Congress to 
examine domestic terrorism and the risk of weapons of mass destruction. Oversight of 
terrorism was assigned to a then-current congressional labyrinth of 11 Senate committees 
and 14 House committees. The Gilmore Commission, after extensive review and 
analysis, suggested that the process be rationalized and simplified by placing more 
authority in the executive branch. The suggestion was firmly rejected.13  
There are also many constituencies that have a vested interest in assuring that 
radical changes to the structure and reporting responsibilities do not change. These 
                                                 
10 Hal G. Rainey, and Barry Bozeman, “Comparing Public and Private Organizations: Empirical 
Research and the Power of the a Priori,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10, no. 2 
(2000): 447–470.  
11 Peters, B. Guy, and Donald J. Savoie. “Managing Incoherence: The Coordination and 
Empowerment Conundrum,” Public Administration Review 56, no. 3 (1996): 281, DOI: 10.2307/976452.  
12 Ibid., 288.  
13 Perrow, “Disaster after 9/11.”    
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factors must be balanced with the disruptions and benefits that technical, educational, and 
administrative advances offer forward-looking organizations.14   
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Homeland security faces many and varied environmental dynamics. Emergent 
threats, changing missions, technological or policy changes, budgetary fluctuations, and 
reorganization/consolidation opportunities place pressure on governmental organizations 
to adapt to new conditions. One of the most basic considerations in establishing new 
practices and organizations or assessing the performance of existing organizations is the 
choice of whether to centralize or decentralize decision making, information systems, and 
other resources. These decisions are often made without adequate analysis. This omission 
may be understandable when the government is reacting to a newly identified threat for 
which the public is demanding action. The formation of DHS after the 9/11 attacks and 
the reorganization and elevation to cabinet level of the FEMA after Hurricane Andrew 
are two examples.15 Still, what makes immediate practical sense for the formation of an 
organization may not make sense once the enterprise is up and running; however, once 
the structure of these organizations is set up, they are rarely revisited absent another 
crisis.16 
When politicians, managers, or other policymakers consider the level of 
decentralization that is appropriate to their organization, two precedent factors must be 
assessed: the stability of the environment and then the strategic archetype that will be 
used to pursue organizational goals. Research shows unambiguously that organizations 
that have internal alignment between their strategic archetype and their level of 
centralization outperform those that are not in alignment. However, strategic typology 
applies not to the stated goals of the organization but to how that organization uses its 
resources to achieve strategic goals. The same strategic methods used in a stable 
                                                 
14 James R. Thompson, “Reinvention as Reform: Assessing the National Performance Review,” 
Public Administration Review 60, no. 6 (2000): 508–521.  
15 Sharon L. Caudle, “Centralization and Decentralization of Policy: The National Interest of 
Homeland Security,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 8, no. 1 (2011): 1–17. 
DOI: 10.2202/1547-7355.1941.    
16 Ibid. 
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environment, like a citizen benefit administration, is not as effective in a homeland 
security scenario that is dynamic and developing both technically and behaviorally. 
Likewise, high levels of centralization are not appropriate to all strategic methods. 
Environment, strategic typology, and level of centralization must all be considered 
together to achieve optimal organizational outcomes.  
This phenomenon was demonstrated in the negotiations and tradeoffs that led up 
to the formation of the Department of Homeland Security. As both the White House and 
Congress demanded authority over the tasking and resources of the new organization, 
best practices for achieving anti-terrorist effectiveness went unexplored in favor of a 
centralized organizational structure with which Congress was familiar and comfortable. 
This structure emphasizes centralized control rather than centralized coordination over 
more decentralized and nimble subunits.17 
Historically, governments have had a centralized command and control 
hierarchical structure that worked well when governance units were small and the amount 
of knowledge required to make informed decisions was centralized with a few well-
educated leaders. Geographical expansion and the time required to cover greater 
distances necessitated that more and more decisions be decentralized and delegated to 
trusted lieutenants nearer where the decisions were needed. However, with delegation 
came more and increasingly complex sets of rules that were to be followed to ensure 
consistency with the strategic goals of the enterprise.18 These same rules and policies that 
allowed for the decentralization of decision making have come to be known colloquially 
as red tape.  
Modern telecommunications has had the effect of virtually eliminating geography 
and associated time lags as a consideration for the location of a decision maker, but 
technology has also resulted in exponential growth of the information that must be 
digested when making informed decisions. This simultaneous expansion of information 
and the contraction of time needed to access critical data occur every day in the homeland 
                                                 
17 Perrow, “Disaster after 9/11.”  
18 John Child, “Organization Structure and Strategies of Control: A Replication of the Aston Study,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 17, no. 2 (1972): 163, DOI: 10.2307/2393951.  
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security field. Internal conflicts over where tasks should be accomplished and who should 
have final authority to either commit resources or deviate from established practices 
persist in all levels of government.19  
Centralization has both advantages and disadvantages, depending on 
organizational strategy, situation, scope, and managerial competence. It is rarely an 
absolute condition that decisions or resources are wholly centralized or decentralized. 
The decision of whether to centralize authorities or resources is often made based on 
heuristics, gut preference, or current practices that may not fit the prospective 
organization’s chosen strategy. Managers or policymakers do not have a ready 
methodology for determining what portions of an organization or process should be 
centralized and which should not. 
The advantages of centralization have generally been characterized as greater 
accountability and consistency. Centralized decision making is often recommended when 
decisions are critical to the wellbeing of the parent organization, are not time sensitive or 
are of marginal importance. The advantages of decentralized processes are listed as 
speed, more potential for innovation, and close proximity to customers with the attendant 
local knowledge that distant, centralized decision makers may lack. The potential span of 
control in large organizations is such that the volume of decisions that must be made on a 
continual basis would overwhelm an overly centralized structure and grind the operation 
to a halt. Also, no matter how independent a subunit of an organization may be, it will 
always have reporting requirements up the managerial hierarchy. Likewise, highly 
formalized and centralized organizations must still grant some measure of autonomy to 
mid-managers and supervisors to deal with problems that are not explicitly covered by 
policy, as well as granting limited leeway in interpreting those policies. 
A possible reason that a more structured approach to such a basic business 
decision has not been developed may be the complexity and ambiguity of the 
centralization decision. In a political organization, the customer at the bottom of the 
organization, usually seen as the citizen, is not the same customer that is giving feedback 
                                                 
19 Paul D. Hutchcroft, “Centralization and Decentralization in Administration and Politics: Assessing 
Territorial Dimensions of Authority and Power,” Governance 14, no. 1 (2001): 25.   
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at the top—this role is reserved for the political sponsor of the agency. Thus, given the 
goal of keeping the decision making near the customer can yield totally different 
conclusions depending on one’s position within the organization.  
Another probable reason for the amount of centralization seen in newly formed 
agencies or business units is that centralization is a basis of power, and the parties 
responsible for creating the organization have an interest in controlling what they are 
going to be held accountable for.20 As the organization develops and evolves, the 
intention may be that the degree of centralization will be adjusted to fit needs as they 
arise. For instance, centralization of decision-making authority may enhance 
accountability and decisional consistency at the expense of nimbleness and employee 
morale. This approach may be appropriate in the early stages of an enterprise when 
employees are not fully trained and the mission of the strategic business unit (SBU) is 
still evolving. As the organization matures and employees reach a point where it would 
be advantageous to the organization to allow decision to be made lower down, a near 
universal maxim kicks in—that managers tend to desire decentralization above them and 
centralization below.21 Thus, decentralization may be resisted up and down the reporting 
chain absent strong pressure to change. 
There appears to be no magic formula to determine the right amount of 
centralization in an organization or a SBU within a larger enterprise. Investigation into 
the problem reveals not so much a knowledge gap as a series of evaluations of individual 
elements that are assessed in isolation or in narrow contexts.22 The same issues of 
authority and excessive formalization in the form of highly detailed policies and 
procedures that bedevil government agencies exists in private industry as well. In fact, 
the literature moves back and forth between for-profit and nonprofit and governmental 
agencies and identifies many similarities. A clear, rational decision-making framework 
                                                 
20 Amy Kates, and Jay Galbraith, Designing Your Organization: Using the Star Model to Solve 5 
Critical Design Challenges, 1st ed. (San Francisco CA: Jossey-Bass, 2007).  
21 Ibid., 163. 
22 Mariano Tommasi, and Federico Weinschelbaum, “Centralization vs. Decentralization: A Principal-
Agent Analysis,” Journal of Public Economic Theory 9, no. 2 (2007): 369–89; Jan W. Rivkin, and Nicolaj 
Siggelkow, “Balancing Search and Stability: Interdependencies among Elements of Organizational 
Design,” Management Science 49, no. 3 (2003): 290–311, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.49.3.290.12740.  
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that is anchored to the proposed strategy of the organization will assure managers that 
they have done due diligence in setting policy. 
B. BACKGROUND AND NEED 
The four key principles listed in the NPR as needing improvement were: “cutting 
red tape, putting customers first, empowering employees to get results, and cutting back 
to basics—producing better government for less.”23 Each of these topics touches on the 
centralization/decentralization debate; however, an inherent tension runs through the 
suggested improvements. Cutting red tape would seem to imply that services should be 
either supplied at a higher level of authority or policies and procedures that are put into 
place to assure accountability should be eliminated. While putting customers first may 
seem like common sense, different levels of the organization perceive a different set of 
customers. At the highest levels of a government agency, directors are overseen by not 
only the executive branch but answer to a minimum of four congressional committees.24 
At the output level, the customer is the end user of the service or product that the agency 
provides. This output may be a citizen receiving an IRS rebate or another government 
agency receiving a tangible good or service, such as printed material or a background 
check.  
The failure of the NPR to have profound, lasting effects across the federal 
bureaucracy speaks to the need to examine the basic assumptions of the recommendations 
and look for opportunities to either expand or improve on them or refute the premises as 
wrong or unworkable. This thesis examines the benefits and problems of decentralization 
of authority and decision making and how the decision to decentralize affects the 
strategic functioning of an organization. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses a qualitative analysis methodology, supported by case study 
analysis, to examine the current practice of determining whether organizational functions 
                                                 
23 Gore, From Red Tape to Results.   
24 Guy, and Savoie. “Managing Incoherence,” 282.  
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and processes should be centralized or decentralized using heuristics, legacy 
organizational practices, or personal preference. No standard practices have been 
identified that can be used to reliably determine the efficacy of centralizing or 
decentralizing processes that backs that decision up with metrics or other disciplined 
analytical tools; however, based on the type, size, and strategic focus of the organization, 
authors have put suggested best practices forward. Specifically, cited research has 
demonstrated that organizations can optimize their performance by matching their 
implementation strategy to the environment. Optimizing the level of centralization to the 
chosen strategy is key successful strategy execution. Specifically, there is wide 
agreement in the literature that operational environments that are unstable or turbulent are 
best served by a forward-leaning strategy that is supported by a decentralized decision-
making structure. This structure would seem to be a good fit in the homeland security 
field that is constantly scanning for new threats and countermeasures to hazards that are 
emergent or still ill defined.  
Setting definitions will also be critical in this portion of the research. Such 
questions as at what level in the organization decisions are taken and the general level of 
decision that can be made by subordinates. For instance, if two offices out of 30 have the 
authority to make important decisions, does that constitute a decentralized model? 
Furthermore, levels of autonomy would be considered to be proportional to the level of 
centralization, but autonomy would then have to be paradigmatically defined. This 
situation can be seen in large organizations that are loosely coupled—that is central 
authority and accountability is retained at higher levels in the organization while 
sufficient autonomy is retained at lower levels of the organization to allow for a rapid 
response to changes in the operating environment without sending ripple effects to the 
higher levels of the organization. From a general overview of best organizational 
practices, the present study focuses on current homeland security practices in information 
sharing and examines if interdependence leads to better sharing of information and data 
resources in both intra- and inter-organizational situations. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. Are there critical factors that can assist in determining the optimum level 
of decisional centralization in an organization? 
2. How can the determination of the correct level of centralization be 
optimized and systematized?  
3. How can managers determine whether a business unit has a strategy that is 
optimally matched to the operating environment and that the level of 
centralization is matched to the strategy? 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter I is the introduction and contains the problem statement, research 
objectives, background and need, methodology used in the thesis, and the chapter 
overview. 
Chapter II is the literature review. The review begins with the classical view of 
the functioning of bureaucracies and the importance that was placed on the centralization 
of authority and decision making. The literature then progresses to the current trend of 
government decentralization and the expected benefits. The review ends with literature 
on how studies done on organization structure and centralization in private sector 
organizations have applicability in government agencies. 
Chapter III presents two case studies that examine the performance of 
organizations based on the level of fit between the chosen implementation strategy, the 
environment, and level of centralization. Case studies have been chosen based on 
applicability to government functions, currency, depth, and conclusiveness. 
Chapter IV is the discussion and analysis of the case studies in light of the 
available literature. The strategic typologies of the examined organizations are examined 
and compared to other current organizations within the homeland security enterprise. In 
addition, the chapter identifies opportunities and challenges for changing existing 
organizational arrangements. 
Finally, Chapter V contains the summary of findings, analysis tools, and policy 
recommendations. 
 12 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 13 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Successful organizations are those that are able to align their mission, operational 
environment, strategy, and organizational structure. One of the most important linkages 
between strategy and organizational structure is the level of centralization or 
decentralization up and down the structure. In well-established organizations, this can 
present a problem if there is a deeply engrained misalignment or if a formerly stable 
environment in which the organization is thriving suddenly shifts or becomes unstable 
due to policy changes, budget cuts, or other factors, such as disruptive technologies. In 
these situations, a shift in strategy will be much easier to achieve than a change in 
organizational culture.25 This can be problematic when existing agencies are given new 
tasks or are required to make basic changes in the way they conduct the everyday 
business of the enterprise. As the Department of Homeland Defense deploys its varied 
resources to face new or emerging threats, the culture and strategic typology of the 
agency that is tasked with addressing the threat has an impact on the agencies’ ultimate 
level of performance.  
The literature review examines basic organizational structure and how 
centralization decisions affect the functioning of the enterprise and what the general 
characteristics, including strengths and weakness, are of centralized or decentralized 
structures. The next portion assesses a methodology to apply a broad typology to 
strategies. Typing the strategies allows for the fair comparison of effects of centralization 
and decentralization in similar contexts rather than similar looking organizations that may 
take totally different approaches to their mission and are therefore unsuitable for 
comparison. The last section pairs the recommended centralization scheme with the best 
strategic typology, given certain environmental conditions. This section also shows how 
strategic studies conducted in the private sector have relevance in the public domain. 
                                                 
25 Kates, and Galbraith, Designing Your Organization, 3. 
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B. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
Organizational theory is an active and evolving branch of sociology; however, 
principles that were set down nearly a hundred years ago by Max Weber, such as span of 
control, unity of command, and bounded authority, are still found in modern texts on 
bureaucracies and adhered to in organizations. However, while Weber focused on how 
the individual functioned within a bureaucracy, texts today take two steps back and 
observe how the organization functions within its environment and how the organization 
adapts to changes within that environment. 
Leading texts used in business schools, such as Kates and Galbraith’s Star 
Model,26 emphasize choosing explicit strategies and then aligning the organization with 
that strategy. While the focus of Kates and Galbraith is on private industry, the model 
they propose has general applicability to public agencies with certain exceptions. The star 
model that they advocate contains five elements that are to be adjusted into alignment to 
yield a successful organization. They list the five critical factors as: capabilities, structure, 
process, reward system, and people.27 Each of these has obvious analogues in the public 
sector, but reward systems and people are severely limited by civil service restrictions in 
the government sphere.  
Galbraith broadly defines strategy as “a company’s formula for success.”28 
Hambrick describes strategy as “a pattern of important decisions that (1) guides the 
organization in its relationships with its environment, (2) affects the internal structure and 
processes of the organization, and (3) centrally affects the organization’s performance.”29 
This describes an organization’s view that it can apply unique strengths that are greater 
than the external challenges, such as competition, emerging technologies, and changing 
customer needs, and thus can succeed in its plans. While Galbraith refers to strategy as a 
way to gain competitive advantage over rival firms, the general description can be used to 
                                                 
26 Ibid.   
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid., 5.  
29 Donald C. Hambrick, “Operationalizing the Concept of Business-Level Strategy in Research,” The 
Academy of Management Review 5, no. 4 (1980): 567–575, DOI: 10.2307/257462.  
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describe governmental agencies that do not face direct competition but are required to 
perform to established criteria. These criteria can then be used to evaluate any proposed 
alternatives to the current services provided. 
To have an organizational structure follow strategy, several key elements of 
design need to be addressed. The first of these is to identify what strong capabilities exist 
within the organization. These capabilities can be any combination of technical, human 
expertise, strong organizational culture of overcoming adversity, processes, or 
procedures. How the organization is administered should align the strategic mission with 
the existing strengths. Because it is easier to change the strategy of an organization than 
to change the culture or develop a new suite of skills from scratch, Kates and Galbraith 
recommend building on strengths and fitting the organization to the strategy that best 
responds to the environment. The formal structure of the organization determines where 
authorities and decision-making power lies.30  
According to Kates and Galbraith, “the four building blocks of organizational 
structure are function, product, geography, and customer.”31 Large organizations may be 
organized along all three lines with product divisions split down into geographical areas, 
etc. A functional structure is one built around functions such as finance, human resources, 
marketing, and the like. In this structure, employees are all managed together to enhance 
knowledge sharing and efficiencies of scale. This type of structure works better for small 
organizations that are not widely spread between products, divisions, or geographical 
areas. 
Large organizations that are split into multiple product divisions may not share 
information well across divisional lines, even concerning those processes that all 
divisions share.32 In large geographical areal divisions, parochialism may become a 
problem as areas compete for resources or recognition. Geographical divisions do tend to 
work well where there are customer differences, government regulations are significantly 
                                                 
30 Kates, and Galbraith, Designing Your Organization, 9.  
31 Ibid., 10.  
32 Ibid., 12–13.  
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different, or the service is delivered on site.33 Galbraith cites an interesting case study 
where the IRS successfully went from being segmented into geographical areas to being 
divided up by customer type-businesses, wage earners, non-profits, etc.34  Functions that 
must be housed at the corporate level include information technology and any subunits 
that must be kept independent, such as legal and internal investigations. 
C. STRATEGIC TYPOLOGIES 
No universally agreed upon definition of strategy exists in the literature; however, 
Alfred Chandler, one of the first academics to promote the concept of strategy as a way 
forward for complex industrial enterprises, defined strategy as “the determination of the 
basic long-term goals and objectives of the enterprise and the adoption of courses of 
action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals.”35 
Chandler’s definition refers primarily to the stated or formulated strategy of an 
organization. How or if that stated strategy is implemented would be considered the 
implementation strategy.36 The way that an organization determines its purpose and the 
needed skills, expertise, and resources to pursue its stated strategy gives rise to strategy 
typologies.  
Strategic typologies are in large part academic constructs that allow researchers to 
examine organizations and classify the methods and patterns of behavior they use to 
pursue their formulated strategy. These classifications allow researchers to speak the 
same language and assure that they are looking at the same phenomena when they assess 
strategic implementation; however, the typologies are more than academic curiosities. 
Research across a wide variety of public and private enterprises demonstrates that proper 
alignment of typology with environment and level of centralization yields superior 
results. 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 14.  
34 Ibid., 15.  
35 Alfred D. Chandler, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise 
(Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1962), 13. 
36 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis the Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving, 4th ed. (New York: Chatham House Publishers, Seven Bridges Press, 2012), 116. 
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Miles et al. identified four main types of strategic typologies that organizations 
exhibit. This model is well tested in both public and private organizations and is generic37 
and comprehensive in scope, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, as there is one 
category (analyzer) that exhibits blended characteristics of two other types. The proposed 
strategy types are listed as: prospector, analyzer, defender, and reactor (P-A-D-R). Each 
of these strategies shows a particular competence when pursuing strategic objectives. 
Prospectors have a special skill in scanning the horizon for the next thing coming and 
attempt to align themselves to be on the leading edge of innovation. Not only are 
prospectors are best adapted to complex or uncertain environments, they are well placed 
to change direction and have a higher risk tolerance. In the private sector, tech and 
software firms are often considered prospectors. In the public domain, government 
agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) would be examples of 
prospectors. 
Defenders have a locked down niche that they assert by constantly improving 
their processes, pricing, or efficiency. Defenders may also spend a great deal of effort to 
maintain any legislative protections that seal other entrants from their market. In the 
private sector, a good example of a defender might be a utility company. In the public 
sector, an agency, such as the Social Security Administration, that has a well-defined and 
stable mission not subject to constantly changing political pressures could be considered 
a defender. 
Analyzers take a middle ground between the prospectors and the defenders. They 
also scan the environment for coming changes and are ready to make changes in their 
products and services, but not before they are assured that the trends are well in their 
favor. They are neither early innovators nor staunch protectors of existing processes and, 
as such, do not reap the rewards of early movers or have the well-honed efficiencies of 
the defenders; however, they are not as exposed to the risk of failed innovation or a 
                                                 
37 Richard M. Walker, “Strategic Management and Performance in Public Organizations: Findings 
from the Miles and Snow Framework,” Public Administration Review 73, no. 5 (2013): 675, DOI: 10.1111/
puar.12073.    
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suddenly shifting environment that can ruin the defenders. The analyzer type is the least 
well defined, and there are instances where an organization that is typified as an analyzer 
shows more prospector characteristics in one case and more of a defender bend in 
another.  
The last strategy type is the reactor. As the name implies, reactors have no set 
strategic view, and through inadequate strategic force or because of outside 
environmental factors, they have not adjusted their strategic38 choices to align with the 
environment. Reactors do not have a set strategy that they will follow, in spite of 
environmental pressures, and, as the name implies, they react to either the path of least 
resistance or away from perceived pain. Organizations in highly politicized environments 
often present as reactors; they will sit and await instructions from on high. Walker and 
others have made the case that often referring to an organization as having a reactor 
strategy is generous because in fact the organization has no strategy at all.39 
In the homeland security domain, agencies would expect high performance by 
properly aligning their implementation strategy with their environment. In the case of 
emerging or disruptive threats, a prospector strategy would be called for because of the 
ability an organization following this strategy to quickly pivot when it detects new 
opportunities. A slower, more formalized structure will cause the organization to miss 
opportunities. A defender archetype is best suited to environments that are more stable or 
predictable, such as in the case of responding to natural disasters, which are both 
understood and predictable in the sense that the uncertainty is related primarily to 
location, timing, and scale. Problems arise when an organization attempts to change its 
strategic alignment to meet the needs of the environment. 
According to Miles et al., three broad problems of changing strategy involve the 
“entrepreneurial problem,” the “engineering problem,” and the “administration 
                                                 
38 Raymond E. Miles et al., “Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process,” The Academy of 
Management Review 3, no. 3 (1978): 546. DOI: 10.2307/257544.     
39 Walker, “Strategic Management and Performance in Public Organizations,” 680; Charles C. Snow, 
“A Configurational Approach to the Integration of Strategy and Organization Research,” Strategic 
Organization 3, no. 4 (2005): 431, DOI: 10.1177/1476127005057965.    
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problem.”40 This adaptive cycle is most evident in newly formed or rapidly growing 
organizations or organizations in crisis.41 The entrepreneurial problem is where the 
organization sets its organizational domain and defines its purpose and declares exactly 
what it does or does not produce or what market it is in. Problems arise when 
environmental conditions drift or suddenly shift, and the organization does not align with 
the new reality. The organization can consider that this problem has been addressed when 
resources are committed to achieving stated goals that are in line with the new situation. 
The engineering problem comes when processes are not put into place that will 
operationalize the goals that have been articulated by management.42 If modifying 
existing technology or processes solves the engineering problem, then there may be no 
need for extensive changes to accommodate the next problem in the sequence that 
presents itself, the administration problem.  
The administrative design of the organization must reflect both the strategic thrust 
of the organization and support the operational processes that achieve the organizational 
goals. Miles et al. add a caveat to what would seem an obvious assertion. They argue that 
an ideal administrative arrangement is not a rationalization of the existing processes but 
must be both a leading and lagging variable in the adaptive process.43 By this 
formulation, they mean that the administrative structure must both serve the current 
practices of the organization to a depth that allows managers to proceed with certainty but 
be configured so that they have the ability to pivot toward future innovations. The 
adaptive cycle is here illustrated in Figure 1 (also see Table 1). 
                                                 
40 Miles et al., “Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process,” 549.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid., 550.  
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Figure 1.  The Adaptive Cycle 
 
 
Table 1.   Adaptive Cycle and Alignment between Strategy, Process, Structure, 
Environment, and Performance by Miles et al.  
Strategy 
Content 
Formulation Implementation Structure Environment Relation to 
Performance 
Prospector Incremental Incremental Decentralized Uncertain Positive 
Defender Rational Rational Centralized Stable Positive 








Negative or worse 
than defender or 
prospector 
Adapted from Richard M. Walker, “Strategic Management and Performance in Public 
Organizations: Findings from the Miles and Snow Framework,” Public Administration 
Review 73, no. 5 (2013), 676.  
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D. ISSUES 
If asked, most managers likely would not know how to classify their organization 
along a continuum of typologies. In all the studies, the researchers assigned the 
typologies after assessment tools were applied to the organizations. The assessment tools 
varied from simple questionnaires to a combination of measurements, questionnaires, and 
researcher observations.44 There were no cases in which the managers asked to directly 
state the type of strategy that their agency pursued. The typology is important to the 
manager because it helps identify the level of centralization and the breadth and depth of 
formalization that will yield the best outcomes. It can also identify those organizations 
that are pursuing a reactor strategy, which is shown to be the worst performing strategy in 
all environments and in at all levels of centralization.45  
While Miles et al. intended that the typologies would be generic and apply to 
large organizations as a whole, subsequent analysis has shown that pure strategies are 
rare in large public organizations; a blend of typologies is more typical.46 In addition, the 
overall typology and performance predictions for Miles et al.’s typology hold true.47 This 
blending of strategies is especially true in cases of organizations that have many varied 
SBUs in different industries, or similar SBUs that are operating in different 
environments, such as in a highly regulated foreign country. This model may also be 
compared to large federal structures like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
which function more along the lines of a holding company than a purpose-built 
organization. However, merely bringing 22 different and disparate organizations under 
one central controlling authority and expecting that the results would be greater control 
and coordination among all the affected agency flies in the face of reality and history. As 
noted by Herbert Emmerich more than 40 years ago, the lesson of history is, “there is a 
                                                 
44 Jeffrey S. Conant, Michael P. Mokwa, and P. Rajan Varadarajan, “Strategic Types, Distinctive 
Marketing Competencies and Organizational Performance: A Multiple Measures-Based Study,” Strategic 
Management Journal 11, no. 5 (1990): 365–383.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Walker, “Strategic Management and Performance in Public Organizations;” Snow, “A 
Configurational Approach to the Integration,” 679.  
47 Ibid., 682–683.  
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persistent, universal drive in the executive establishment for freedom from managerial 
control and policy direction.”48  
This potential lack of an overall strategic approach to management within an 
organization gives rise to one of the characteristics of public management that 
distinguishes it from private enterprise, and that is the ability of the managers to set 
strategy based on the local environment. In the public sphere, strategy may often be set to 
achieve goals that are not directly related to the stated goals of the organization, or may 
be so slow to adapt to changing conditions, that the stated strategy devolves to reactor 
status.  
1. Applying Private Practices to the Public Domain 
Much of the traditional management literature has for years asserted that private 
and public management are so different that lessons drawn from the study of one could 
not be applied in any meaningful way to the other.49 Very good reasons are put forward 
as to why the management is fundamentally different. For instance, Pandey and Wright 
suggest that among the forces working exclusively in the public sector are that: 
• The market forces of supply and demand are skewed because the 
purchaser in the public sector is often different than the beneficiary. 
• Policymakers may not delegate authority for strictly political reasons. 
• Agencies are faced with vague or conflicting goals, such as a demand of 
“fairness” that does not apply in the private sector. 
• Organizational goal ambiguity that leads to excessive centralization and 
red tape. 
• The lack of easily measured outcomes leads to process substituting for 
results. 
                                                 
48 Herbert Emmerich, Federal Organization and Administrative Management (Tuskalooska, AL: 
University of Alabama Press, 1971), 17.    
49 George Boyne, “Public and Private Management: What’s the Difference?” Journal of Management 
Studies 39 (2002): 97.    
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• The turbulent environment that comes from changing political 
requirements that may be divorced from the agency’s current mission or 
strategy.50 
While the above differences may seem like received wisdom, when actually put to 
empirical testing, the differences narrowed sharply. In 2002, Boyne performed a meta-
analysis of studies that had compared private with public management across 13 
dimensions in order to assess Sayre’s phrase that public and private organizations are 
“fundamentally alike in all unimportant aspects.”51 The assessed categories included 
absence of competitive pressures, more bureaucracy and red tape, lower managerial 
autonomy, instability, complexity, and lower managerial commitment. Across all 13 
dimensions that he had set out to assess, Boyne found that five of the dimensions had not 
been studied adequately enough to draw conclusions. Of the 13 dimensions that were 
assessed, only the attributes of “more bureaucratic,” managers being “less materialistic,” 
and having “weaker organizational commitment” were found to hold true in a statistically 
meaningful way.52  Table 2 summarizes Boyne’s findings comparing attitudinal and 









                                                 
50 S. K. Pandey, “Connecting the Dots in Public Management: Political Environment, Organizational 
Goal Ambiguity, and the Public Manager’s Role Ambiguity,” Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory 16, no. 4 (2006): 511–514, DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muj006.  
51 Ibid., 98.  
52 Boyne, “Public and Private Management,” 116.  
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Table 2.   Summary of Support for Publicness Hypotheses 
 0 <50% >50% 
Environment 























































H9 more red tape 0 2 2 
H10 lower managerial 
autonomy 
0 2 2 
Values 







H12 stronger public interest 
motives 
1 1 2 
H13 weaker organizational 
commitment 
1 0 3 
 
Notes: 
1. Figures show number of studies with support scores of zero, less than or 
equal to 50 percent, or more than 50 percent. 
2. X = no tests of this hypothesis. 
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In the end, Boyne’s assessment of the overall comparability of private versus 
public management is “don’t know.”53 However, Rainey and Bozeman take a more 
confident approach to the question. They assert that much of the research has started from 
premise that the two management tasks are so different that basic research has either been 
lacking because it is assumed that the question has been answered or the research that has 
been done has been slanted toward affirming what has been assumed.54 Goal ambiguity 
in public agencies when faced with seemingly contradictory missions, such as 
conservation versus development as an urban planner, were assumed by researchers such 
as Wallace Sayre and Graham Allison55 to be intractable problems for managers and a 
source of role ambiguity that is not present in the private sector. However, when 
questioned about the clarity of the mission they were expected to perform, public 
managers differed little from their private counterparts.56 Another assumption about 
public agencies that is thought to hinder them is the amount of formalization in the 
organization as defined by a maze of rules and considerations that are not present in 
private enterprises. Here again, research has discovered this not a given. Furthermore, 
researchers have found this to be the case in certain instances, such as personnel 
decisions or purchasing processes that had been highly centralized. For instance, the 
literature references federal requirements to go through the General Services 
Administration (GSA) for routine purchases.57 This level of formalization can work well 
for established governmental agencies, such as the U.S Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), whose mission varies little from year to year; however, in rapidly evolving 
realm of homeland security, wherein a rapidly developing terrorist capability or 
unforeseen pandemic requires quick reaction, such onerous procedures can have 
catastrophic consequences. While this may seem a dramatic overstatement to say that 
managers will be unable or unwilling to respond forcefully in the case of a crisis, their 
                                                 
53 Ibid., 113.  
54 Rainey, and Bozeman. “Comparing Public and Private Organizations,” 449.   
55 Graham T. Allison, Public and Private Management: Are They Fundamentally Alike in All 
Unimportant Respects? (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
1979).  
56 Ibid., 453.  
57 Ibid., 453–454.  
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hands may well be tied by legislation. For instance, the Antideficiency Act restricts the 
expenditure of funds to only those specific programs and projects authorized by 
Congress, within an identified timeframe.58 Managers that violate this law can be held 
criminally liable. 
Rainey and Bozeman conclude their assessment of available comparisons with the 
statement that:  
Unless there is reason to believe that problems of measurement, logic, or 
bias that are systematic [authors’ emphasis] across a wide range of studies 
(a possible, but not very probable, proposition), the convergence of 
findings (that public and private management are more similar than 
different) lends strong support to the conclusion that the results are true.59 
While differences between public and private management are acknowledged in all the 
literature, most core functions and managerial attitudes are similar enough to allow for 
comparison across the domains.  
2. Centralization versus Decentralization 
To centralize or decentralize decision making and functions is one of the primary 
assessments that is made in an organization. The question of the right amount of 
centralization in an organization is pivotal to matching the structure to the chosen 
strategy. The writers in this field are all in agreement as to the necessity of getting the 
mix right, but they fully agree on little else, including the definition of centralization. If 
the disagreement was purely about matching strategy to organizational structure, there 
would be some hope for a mechanistic approach to the problem; however, beyond 
efficiency and efficacy lies the question of who will wield power in the organization. In 
the words of Kates and Galbraith, “Centralization versus decentralization is one of the 
most highly charged issues in organizational design, as it to the heart of where power lies 
in a system.”60  
                                                 
58 Donald F. Kettl, “Managing Boundaries in American Administration: The Collaboration 
Imperative,” Public Administration Review 66, no. S1 (2006): 10–19.   
59 Ibid., 466.  
60 Kates, and Galbraith, Designing Your Organization, 142.  
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Max Weber, the originator of the term “bureaucracy,” conceptualized the 
organization based on six principles: 
• There are jurisdictional boundaries that are set by rule 
• Organizations have a fixed hierarchy of authority 
• The organization is administered via written files 
• Managers are well trained 
• Management of the bureaucracy is a full time profession 
• The management runs the organization through general rules and 
procedures that are relatively stable, more or less exhaustive, and that can 
be learned.61 
From these principles are derived organizational concepts such as span of control and 
unity of command and authority that are still widely taught and practiced in 
organizations. Both implicit and explicit in Weber’s work was the concept of 
centralization and the notion of a boss who whose main job it was to make the important 
decisions.62 It was the workers’ job to carry out the orders of the boss.  
By the mid-1960s, sociologists had begun questioning the utility of Weber’s 
model. In 1965, Zannetos was referring to the “vague notions …of unity of command, 
span of control, responsibility, and authority.”63 Indeed, Zannetos advocated for the 
decentralization of large enterprises and attempted to reduce the level of decentralization 
needed to a mathematical formula.64 Additionally, Zannetos acknowledged that the 
formula could only be used on theoretical organizations and decentralization was a 
relative term. In actual practice, he identified level of decentralization through a three-
step process. The first step is to observe the number of hierarchal levels in the 
organization. More layers indicate more decentralization. The second test was the quality 
of decisions that are made in lower levels of the organization. Lower-level decisions that 
had impact beyond the subunit would be an indicator of decentralization rather than 
                                                 
61 Roger Mansfield, “Bureaucracy and Centralization: An Examination of Organizational Structure,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 18, no. 4 (1973): 477–488, DOI: 10.2307/2392200.    
62 Ibid.   
63 Zenon Zannetos, “On the Theory of Divisional Structures: Some Aspects of Centralization and 
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64 Ibid, B-53.  
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typical delegation. The last test is to determine the number of decisions that are made 
within the subunit as opposed to originating from outside but not necessarily above the 
subunit. This last test of dependency would be illustrated by units that must negotiate for 
resources from sister subunits of a larger enterprise.65 Such a situation is demonstrated in 
FEMA responses. FEMA itself only has approximately 2,400 employees, and it must 
depend on other federal and local resources to implement its emergency plans.66 
Zannetos also makes a helpful distinction between control and decision making in 
that control implies reacting to inputs and applying knowledge or resources in reaction to 
the environment based on rules and practice. Decision making “goes beyond control in 
that it includes future planning and the assessment of the future consequences of present 
decisions.”67 
Kates and Galbraith call the decision to centralize or decentralize “one of the most 
vexing questions in organizational design.”68 They also explain, “more than any other 
organization design change, the oscillating between centralization and decentralization is 
more often and attempt to correct past abuses than a forward looking method of 
implementing a strategic direction.”69 The authors look at situations in which it usually 
clear-cut as to whether centralization makes sense. One such example is the corporate 
center strategy. This strategy centralizes resources and decision making at the 
headquarters level where value is added throughout the organization in such matters as 
legal and public relations. For the most part, these are fairly generic services that do not 
depend on specialized knowledge that is found lower in the organization. Corporate 
center strategy can also be successful in developing talent that will be used and shared 
across the enterprise and be able to take a strategic view of the operation when assigned 
                                                 
65 Ibid., B54–B55.  
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to any of the units. In general, the more diverse or widespread the enterprise, the less 
value can be added at the headquarters level.70 
While the exact definitions of centralizing or decentralizing vary among the 
authors, they are in general agreement as to the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
each. In general, centralization is valuable to ensure consistency across the enterprise. 
Centralization has also been claimed to be a more efficient system in that decisions are 
often require approval at a higher level, thus decreasing the risk of errors.71 However, 
this advantage can quickly be negated if the centralized authority proves to be 
incompetent, as was alleged concerning FEMA chief Michael Brown during Hurricane 
Katrina.72 Centralization also assures that resources are properly allocated, their use is 
maximized, size creates leverage with regulators and vendors, and operations can be 
more tightly controlled from the center. Kates and Galbraith make the seemingly 
paradoxical claim that only very trivial or very important decisions are best made at the 
center of a large enterprise.73 An important decision taken at the center of an enterprise is 
going to resonate down to the lowest levels where the effects of the decision may not 
have been well thought out by the organizational center. Therefore, the decision needs to 
be critical for the wellbeing of the entire enterprise, even at the expense of some lower 
level effectiveness. The comment about taking trivial decisions at the center is just an 
acknowledgement that routine decisions should be made at the SBU level and not pushed 
up the command chain.  
Advantages of decentralization include speed of decision making, a better record 
of innovation, differentiation where appropriate, closeness to customers, and ability to 
rapidly adapt to environmental changes. Disadvantages include potential duplication of 
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effort, loss of standardization, estrangement from the parent organization, and 
communications silos. 
3. Matching Strategy to Centralization Decisions 
Several empirical and meta-studies have been conducted to measure the effects of 
centralization and decentralization when combined with each of Miles et al.’s four 
strategic typologies of prospector, analyzer, defender, and reactor. While some caveats 
are given, especially in the naming of organizational strategies as analyzers as opposed to 
firms that act as reactors in some instances and defenders in other, the model has been 
supported by Govindarajan, Desarbo and others. Govindarajan, utilizing an extensive 
literature review, has studied the link between decentralization and effectiveness as 
measured against three strategic models: four typologies of Miles et al., the build versus 
harvest model, and Porter’s differentiation versus low cost model.74 For analysis, 
Govindarajan considers the dimensions of environmental uncertainty, technology, and 
interdependence. While all models basically tracked each other in expected result, the 
Miles et al. model was more nuanced as a result of not being as binary as the other 
models. Govindarajan developed a series of hypotheses that can be summarized as: in 
turbulent environments, a prospector strategy with higher levels of decentralization is 
more successful. For stable environments, a defender strategy with higher levels of 
centralization yields best results.  
This same pattern held for technological changes. In the case of high 
interdependence between SBUs, it was found that prospectors did more poorly with high 
levels of interdependence with other SBUs as a result of being slowed down to the pace 
of the slowest interdependent SBU. Defender organizations did well with more 
interdependencies and were able to successfully leverage more resources.  
Desarbo et al. conducted a study of the P-A-D-R typology through a survey of 
800 firms in China, Japan, and the U.S. in which they measured strategy in the five areas 
of market-linking, technological, marketing, information technology, and management 
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capabilities.75 In their survey, Miles et al. then used the results to divide the firms into 
four groups that were derived by combining their relative strengths with the strategy 
typology as proposed. As expected, no firm had a pure typology across the board. The 
results of the analysis again validated the general typology originally proposed. The 
general findings of Miles et al. were that prospector/analyzer firms operate well in high 
tech, rapidly changing environments, and are not especially strong in marketing, as the 
market is so rapidly changing. Defender/reactor firms had strong marketing and 
management skills and were weaker in technology skills. Widely mixed firms had 
stronger management and market-linking skills but were the worst performers of the four 
groups. Interestingly, every firm in this category of worst-performing groups came from 
the United States.76 The last group is also prospector/analyzers like the first group, but 
these firms had strong performance across all the dimensions, along with the second 
group composed of defender/reactors, were the strongest performing firms.  
This large study again tends to validate the model of Miles et al. across a wide 
range of industries and cultures. A shortcoming of the study, for purposes of this 
literature review, is that none of the units studied were government entities, although in 
2005, when the study was conducted, there was considerable government involvement in 
Chinese firms. 
4. Switching Centralization Strategy in an Existing Organization 
The centralization versus decentralization debate is ongoing both in the private 
sector and in public agencies. For instance, in 2003, the Home Depot centralized its 
purchasing from its regional offices into a single location at its Atlanta headquarters at 
the same time that Lowes was decentralizing its purchasing.77 The irony is that each may 
well have been making the proper strategic move given its competitive environment. In 
this same timeframe, the DHS was being formed from 22 separate and largely 
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autonomous agencies into one, centrally controlled entity. Given that organizations are 
constantly being amalgamated and larger organizations formed through mergers and 
acquisitions, this may seem as another example of business as usual, however, moving 
from a decentralized structure to a centralized one is more difficult than moving in the 
opposite direction.78  
Hollenbeck et al. found that the efficiencies and organizational accountability that 
are more typical of centralized organizations were lost when moving personnel who were 
more used to operating in a freer, decentralized system. Conversely, the team found that 
employees moving from a more structured, team-oriented, environment were much more 
easily absorbed into a decentralized system. This difficulty lies in fact that employees, 
coming from a loosely coupled organization who are responsible for their own decisions 
and performance, balk more at the control built into tightly coupled systems.  
The researchers found that the employees going from the tight structure to the 
looser one adapted more quickly and more thoroughly. The experimentally validated 
hypothesis of Hollenbeck et al. indicates that in making a change from a more 
decentralized structure and moving to a centralized one, “centralization will be negatively 
related to both efficiency and adaptability.”79 This may go some way in explaining some 
of the initial problems that DHS has had in bringing all its diverse elements into a unified 
whole. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
The role of centralization in public organizations is an important and unsettled 
issue that stretches back to the beginning of the study of bureaucracy. The importance of 
having the right level of centralization is a matter of both efficiency and efficacy. 
Organizations that are too highly centralized are slow to respond to customer demands 
and create frustration among both the customers and the employees by requiring rivers of 
red tape. Organizations that are too decentralized may not be conducting business in 
accordance within required guidelines, and this can create problems of inequity, 
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duplication of efforts, or actually working at cross purposes with other parts of the 
organization.  
Appropriate levels of centralization can be determined by matching the 
organizational strategy with the operating environment. A mismatch between strategy 
and environment or strategy and level of centralization leads to decreased performance in 
all studied cases. Therefore, government calls for increased decentralization in order to 
increase responsiveness may not be appropriate if the given organization’s strategy and 
environment are not properly matched with a need for decentralization. 
Although the majority of strategy typology studies have been conducted on 
private enterprises, research has shown that many of the differences between the 
management of public and private organizations are more perceived than real. With some 
exceptions, such as personnel policies, there is more overlap between the two types of 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
A. CASE STUDY ONE 
Many studies are conducted of industries, businesses, or other types of 
organizations to better understand the factors that influence performance. These 
individual studies are usually limited to a single organization or, occasionally, an entire 
industry due to time and cost restraints. The various studies also use different methods 
and typologies in their studies so that they can be difficult to compare and correlate with 
similar studies using different measurements or typologies. This meta-study confirms the 
efficacy of strategic typology of Miles et al. in a business setting and supports their 
contention that matching strategy to environment results in enhanced performance. 
The examined case was conducted to examine the efficacy of Miles et al. strategic 
typology theory using a wide cross-section of studies and methodologies. This meta-
study, taken on as a doctoral class project at the University of Oklahoma, evaluates 40 
tests of the environment-performance linkage as described by multiple researchers using 
different methodologies and timeframes. Throughout organizational research, different 
authors have assigned different names to similar constructs concerning the relationship of 
an organization’s strategic configuration to its long-term performance in a given type of 
environment. At various times, organizational strategic typology has been identified 
using different terminology and identifying characteristics. These strategies were then 
used to attempt to predict performance based on an optimal fit between the chosen 
strategy and the environment in which the organization was operating. The predicted 
relationship between strategy and environment is a key component of structural 
contingency theory.80  
The analyzed meta-study used a jury system to place the firms in either a stable or 
unstable environment and then ranked each organization along a continuum as either 
more of a defender type, with strong centralization and formalization, or a prospector 
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type, using a more informal and decentralized strategy. The jury also ranked the studies 
by whether they were cross-sectional or longitudinal and whether predictions coming out 
of the study were inductive or deductive. These additional comparison points were used 
to assess hypotheses about the expected results of the meta-analysis. 
A series of hypotheses were developed for the meta-study: 
• Hypothesis one: As a group, extant studies reveal performance differences 
between organizational configurations.  
• Hypothesis two: Studies using inductively derived configurations will 
report a stronger relationship (higher meta-analytic effect-size estimates) 
with performance than studies using deductively derived configurations.  
• Hypothesis three: Studies using longitudinal designs will report stronger 
configurations-performance relationships than studies using cross-
sectional designs.81 
The results of the meta-study confirmed the first hypothesis that different 
organizational configurations yielded different performance levels given a similar 
environment. Using statistical methods, the researchers calculated that 28 percent of the 
difference in performance for any given firm was attributable to matching the 
organizational configuration to the environment.82 What the Ketchen et al. did not find 
was that certain configurations were precluded by environmental factors. In fact, all 
typologies were present in all environments—they just exhibited different levels of 
performance. 
In somewhat of a surprise to the Ketchen et al., hypothesis two was not supported 
by the analysis. The researchers had hypothesized that because measurements of adopted 
strategy are broadly subjective, confirmation bias would tend to direct researchers to a 
model that broadly fit their observations. This was not borne out by the meta-study. The 
prediction of performance was statistically identical in both cases where configuration 
was derived inductively and deductively.83 Hypothesis three showed markedly stronger 
effect sizes from longitudinal studies than from cross-sectional studies and was thus 
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supported. This hypothesis was based on the assumption that cross-sectional studies yield 
a snapshot of the company’s strategy and performance. As strategy has been shown to 
drift over time,84 longitudinal studies would be expected to demonstrate a more 
consistent pattern of strategic choices and a better gauge of performance. 
In conclusion, the Ketchen et al. claim, “The results remove any equivocality 
surrounding configurations’ ability to predict performance.”85 The fact that the 
longitudinal studies were more predictive than the cross-sectional studies is also telling, 
as the cross-sectional studies are more of a snapshot in time. In addition, the environment 
that the organization is operating in may be in flux at that particular moment; however, is 
not indicative of the longer time horizons for which enterprises must be configured. The 
researchers also found wide agreement between the competing typologies that the various 
studies had used to describe the organizational configurations. They recommend a 
common vocabulary for future studies to allow for easier comparisons of results in the 
future.86 
These findings are significant in that they validate the predictive power of 
strategic typology in studies done over a period of 25 years in multiple disciplines using 
varying methodologies. The theory also holds up whether it is applied inductively of 
deductively, adding to its probability of validity. The longitudinal studies also add weight 
to the veracity of the typologies and their long-term effect on performance. The study by 
Ketchen et al. also shows that organizations with a mismatched configuration can survive 
and even thrive under certain conditions; however, businesses that are not matching their 
implementation strategy to the environment are putting themselves at a competitive 
disadvantage. This becomes suggestive when applied to protected government agencies. 
Since most government agencies operate in a protected environment with little to no 
competitive forces acting on them and no yardstick of comparison, they seem to be doing 
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very well with a mismatched environment and strategy. In fact, they may be seriously 
undershooting their potential by as much as 32 percent.87 
A limitation of the study by Ketchen et al. is that no government entities are 
included; yet, this need not be a fatal shortcoming. In the case of these studies, 
performance is measured by fiscal performance, which would not apply to government or 
non-profit agencies. The studies that were part of the meta-study were nonetheless broad 
in scope, looking at everything from turbulent businesses, such as electronics to highly 
regulated industries (e.g., banking, insurance, and health care). The point of this meta-
analysis was to validate the connection between organizational configuration and long-
term performance, which is what the study in fact shows. A difficulty in applying a meta-
study such as this to public entities is that some agencies supply only services that are 
very difficult to measure (e.g., homeland security) and thus quantifying the relative 
success of one agency against another in similar environments. To say that the same 
percentage of success could be applied to public entities is not supported, but the value of 
strategic alignment is. 
A key assumption in strategic typology is that defender type-organizations do best 
in stable environments, and typically they have very formalized procedures and 
centralized decision making. At the other end of the spectrum, where the organization is 
dealing in an uncertain or constantly changing environment, a prospector strategy is 
called for. This strategy relies on few rules and more decentralized ability to make 
decisions based on a rapidly changing environment and a need for innovation.  
These typologies have been applied to public agencies with similar expectations. 
Prospectors would be identified as leaders in their fields and would be innovative and 
would potentially be expected to intrude into other agencies’ policy spaces.88 A defender 
would be protective of the current political space and budget and not be looking to 
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expand or contract its activities, and a reactor would be identified by having its actions 
imposed on it either from above or through regulatory processes.89 
B. CASE STUDY TWO 
The next case examines the effect of centralization and organizational strategy on 
public agencies. In addition, this case study examines how centralization, both in and of 
itself and in combination with organizational strategy, affected the performance of 53 
separate United Kingdom (UK) public service agencies. The particular agencies that were 
studied were all Welsh local authorities. The theory behind using Welsh agencies was 
that all the different agencies would have the same governing rules and policies, and thus 
no adjustments would need to be made for dissimilar oversight. Additionally, all Welsh 
agencies are audited on a yearly basis, thus giving baseline and comparative information. 
The service provided by the agencies were “education, social care, regulatory services, 
(such as land use planning and waste management), housing, welfare benefits, leisure, 
and cultural services.”90 Specifically, the study looked at eight educational institutions, 
nine social services organizations, seven housing authorities, seven road departments, 10 
public safety agencies, and 12 benefit and revenue departments.91 Another feature of the 
Welsh local agencies is that they are free to develop their own means of delivering 
service so long as they achieve stated objectives. Because of this, each service sector was 
expected to have a mix of defenders, prospectors, reactors, and analyzers. 
The Welsh system of governance in the case being examined may be considered 
collaborative federalism in that the national government supports independent action by 
the state or local governments. This is in contrast to the U.S. system that is more of a dual 
federalism in which each level of government asserts sovereignty.92 Thus, performance 
feedback in the Welsh system differs significantly from the U.S. system in several ways. 
Additionally, the Welsh system allows for local experimentation in service delivery, and 
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the effects of those services is then measured against both other similar services and the 
previous year’s baseline of service delivery. This allows for both customization for local 
conditions as well as the evaluation and adoption of improved methods.  
In the United States, a corporate center or headquarters that prescribes acceptable 
methods of doing business across the country and exercises policy control from the top to 
control federal agencies. This model has not allowed for attempting multiple strategies, 
which are then measured for efficacy. Thus, the literature assessing strategic typologies 
has focused on European countries. Different strategies for addressing common problems 
are commonly used at the state level, but varying policies and governance in the states, as 
well as differing measures of success, does not allow for a common baseline from which 
to measure. This being said, the individual types of services and the means of delivering 
those services in the Welsh system are analogous to service provision in the U.S. The 
available literature on equivalent studies of U.S. security agencies is lacking. 
The purpose of the study was to identify the type and environment that the 
agencies operated in and then determine the strategic fit of the agencies and compare the 
success of the agencies that had adopted different strategies in similar environments. 
While the different agencies were not in direct competition with one another, they could 
be compared to both baseline performance measures and similar agencies with similar 
performance metrics. Degree of centralization and strategy typology were determined by 
surveys that were distributed to the senior and middle managers in each of the studied 
agencies.  
This project was taken on in response to a relative lack of research on the effects 
on performance by public entities in relationship to their degree of centralization.93 The 
lack of empirical study of the effects of centralization on public agencies is surprising 
because so much has been assumed about the effects. Early texts, such as Taylor’s 
“scientific management,” espoused centralization as a condition of good management in 
large organizations.94 Later, authors came to blame excessive centralization in 
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government for slowness, excessive rules, organizational bloat, and indifference to 
customer needs.95 The research that has been done has been contradictory; some studies 
show significant benefits to centralization, and others show the opposite.96 Overall, the 
authors determine that the preexisting evidence is that centralization has no profound 
impact on the performance of public agencies.97 This becomes all the more significant in 
light of the strong push to decentralize government functions as espoused in the NPR.98 
Where Andrews et al. aimed to differ from the previous studies on centralization 
effects is that they coupled the level of centralization with Miles’s et al. P-A-D-R 
strategic typology and measured the effects of having a properly matched level of 
centralization and strategy. The authors used the classic pairing of a more aggressive 
centralization mode with a defender strategy that attempted to enhance and improve 
existing services and products. A more decentralized decision-making model is more 
appropriate to a prospector strategy, which is looking to disrupt the status quo with new 
products, methods, or technologies. Because of the rapid pace of change in the 
prospector’s environment, rigid rules and policies would not cover rapidly emerging 
opportunities or threats. Likewise, long lines of communication and the time needed to 
bring upper level decision makers up to speed on evolving events are too slow to be able 
to take advantage of changing circumstances. In these cases, authority is vested in lower 
level employees. 
Andrews et al. conducted the research with an eye to whether the individual 
agencies were looking at both the “lagging and leading” relationship with strategy.99 The 
lagging portion of strategy analysis looks backward over past performance and attempts 
to discern those portions of both the strategy and the implementation that led to the 
results, whether good or bad. The leading portion looks to the future to see what sorts of 
adjusts must be made to either bring the strategy into alignment with the environment, or 
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to bring implementation into line with the chosen strategy.100 Measurement of degree of 
centralization was determined by level in the organization that had the power to make 
decisions and the amount of input different levels had in the decision-making process. 
As with other studies, the strategic typology was determined by administering 
questionnaires based on a seven-point Likert scale to the managers in the various 
agencies. The questions and the indicators of typology used by Andrews, Boyne, and 
Walker are listed in Table 3.101  
Table 3.   Survey Items and Factor Analysis for Strategy Archetypes 
Prospector Defender Reactor 
We continually redefine our 
service priorities. 
We seek to maintain stable 
service priorities 
We have no definite service 
priorities 
We seek to be the first to 
identify new modes of 
delivery. 
The service emphasizes 
efficiency of provision. 
We change provision only 
when under pressure from 
external agencies. 
Searching for new 
opportunities is a major part 
of our overall strategy 
We focus on our core 
activities. 
We give little attention to 
new opportunities for 
service delivery. 
We often change our focus 
to new areas of service 
provision. 
 The service explores new 
opportunities only when 
under pressure from 
external agencies. 
  We have no consistent 
response to external 
pressure. 
N=90   
Adapted from Rhys Andrews, George A. Boyne, Jennifer Law, and Richard M. Walker, 
“Centralization, Organizational Strategy, and Public Service Performance,” Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory 19, no. 1 (2007): 57–80. DOI: 
10.1093/jopart/mum039.    
                                                 
100 Miles et al. “Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process,” 550.  
101 Andrews et al., “Centralization, Organizational Strategy, and Public Service Performance,” 67.  
 43 
When considering the isolated performance effects of centralized versus 
decentralized decision-making, there was no apparent effect. Andrews, Boyne, and 
Walker propose that in a public agency, the need to build support for a decision among 
various interest groups may negate any advantages that come from rapid decision 
making.102 However, when the degree of centralization was paired with strategic fit, the 
authors found, “Organizations that adopt a defending strategy enhance their performance 
if they centralize authority and reduce decision participation.”103  
In the case of prospector organizations, it was found that the optimal level of 
centralization involved more participatory decision-making as opposed to simply 
delegating decisions down the command chain.104 While this may seem counter to the 
proposition laid out initially by Miles et al., by linking the street-level operators with the 
management who should have both a more strategic view of the operation and more 
information gleaned from collaboration with other managers and operators, better 
decisions could be expected as well as better implementation if the operator knows the 
critical factors that went into making the decision in the first place. 
As expected, the level of centralization had no determinant effect on reactor 
organizations. Active participation of different levels of the organization in decision 
making also failed to affect performance in these organizations. By definition, reactors 
are driven by outside influences, and thus the opportunity to make substantive decisions 
may not be available, or the organization may lack the capacity to make decisions that 
resist outside influences.105 
The conclusions of the case study are significant in several ways. Andrews, 
Boyne, and Walker were able to show an empirical, rather than a perceptual, impact of 
aligning centralization, strategy, and environment in public agencies. The study also 
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undercuts the general push for more decentralization as a good in and of itself, as has 
been recommended in texts such as Reinventing Government and the NPR.106  
The limitations of the study are that it was done as a cross-sectional study rather 
than a longitudinal study, and thus the results may not be strong over a longer time that 
proves to be more tumultuous or across different levels or types of governments. Also, 
according to the authors Andrews, Boyne, and Walker, “It is possible that causation leads 
in the reverse direction to that hypothesized: levels of performance in certain contexts 
determine the adoption of particular strategies and organizational structures.”107 The use 
of empirical data, such as school scores, benefits processed on time, and pedestrian 
deaths, may also have unintended consequences in that these well known, static issues 
represent a fairly stable environment that the organizations were working in. These well-
known issues have a long history and are not emergent or unexpected problems, but the 
methods for dealing with them may well be new or unique. Another anomaly in the 
public sector may be the lack of interference or high level political meddling in these 
local jurisdictions. However, empirical data and an unambiguous baseline of performance 
is a compelling validation of the value of matching centralization to strategy, and strategy 
to environment. 
The simplicity of the questionnaire that was used to identify the strategic typology 
of the studied agencies is also interesting from the point that while it is likely that most 
managers would be able to identify what their strategic goals are, they would have 
difficulty in identifying the adaptive process that would give them the best chance of 
success,108 and thus the best strategic implementation combination as identified in this 
study. 
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IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
A. CENTRALIZATION VERSUS DECENTRALIZATION 
As conceived by Max Weber, centralization was a definitional aspect of 
bureaucracy. Into the owner or top manager was vested the knowledge, power, and 
authority to direct all the work and utilize all the resources of the organization.109 As 
organizations grew in both size and complexity, the amount of decisions and the 
specialized knowledge required to run the different work units of the larger U.S 
corporations had far outstripped the abilities of even the most talented executives, and 
power had devolved down the organizational structure to the work unit level. By 1965, 
organizations had grown so large, complex, and decentralized that Zannetos wrote of the 
coming revolution in computerization that would allow for the recentralization of 
industry in America.110 
The concept of centralization is straightforward—it is that the power to make 
decisions and access resources are located at the highest levels of the organizational 
hierarchy. Hage and Aiken explain, “The first indicator of centralization is a measure of 
the power to make work decisions, which we call hierarchy of authority.”111 This power 
is then extended to make policy decisions and finally the power to make work decisions 
that affect the organizational structure.112 Andrews, Boyne, and Walker et al., when 
speaking specifically of public agencies, add the dimension of participation in the 
decision-making process.113 That is, the further down in hierarchy that people are 
meaningfully consulted on policy decisions, or take consensual decisions, the more 
decentralized the organization.  
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The benefits of this centralized type of a power structure are nearly universally 
listed as enhancing the ability to ensure consistency and accountability throughout the 
organization, eliminate duplication, control resources, and achieve economies of scale. 
Disadvantages of centralization are acknowledged as slowing down decision making, 
removal of decision makers from end customers, and excess formalization of processes in 
the form of extensive and detailed policies and procedures that are used as a proxy for 
authority in the lower levels of the organization.  
In bureaucracies, this formalization is typically known as “red tape.”“ A high 
level of formalization is nearly a requirement of highly centralized organizations. 
Extensive use of formulaic rules and detailed policies help assure consistency across wide 
distances, both geographically and organizationally. While the term “red tape” is usually 
used in a pejorative sense in that seemingly simple tasks have many detailed steps or take 
an inordinate amount of time to accomplish, these rules were put into place as a response 
to an experienced or anticipated problem. Governmental processes are often designed to 
move slowly to assure that such requirements as adequate public notice can be observed. 
As Guy and Savoie note, “One man’s red tape is another man’s due process.”114 
While it may seem that decentralization would just be the opposite of 
centralization, the effects are more nuanced than may be detected by intuition. 
Advantages of decentralization are generally seen as increased speed to get a decision, 
greater innovation, as more people are looking at solving problems rather than looking to 
a policy manual or a higher-up for a solution. In a decentralized organization, decisions 
are made closer to where the end users of the product or service are, which allows for 
more individualized service. The effect on employees is often better in a decentralized 
system as employee morale and efficiency are improved as result of the ability to develop 
talent locally and employees feel more empowered.115  
Modern communications and information technology have made many of the 
older industrial hierarchal organizational structures less desirable. These structures were 
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based on the assumption that work was predictable and could be broken down into 
simple, discrete tasks that would be accomplished by workers with little education or 
training. Decision making was reserved for those higher in the organization who had the 
education, training and, most importantly, the information needed to make decisions. 
Better trained and educated workforces, along with the spread of modern information 
networks, renders much of the former reasoning for a hierarchal structure obsolete, but 
the structure itself still carries benefits in certain situations.  
Many high level public agencies, including the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), have subscribed to the New Public Management movement that 
encourages decentralization as a general solution to the impersonal and ponderous pace 
of government action. Decentralization has also been put forward as creating more 
accountability in government, limiting the size of government due to eliminating middle 
layers of management, and restricting opportunities for corruption.116 However, other 
research has shown that decentralization is not a panacea in its own right. One problem 
with large-scale decentralization on an enterprise level in government is that agencies can 
find themselves working at exact cross-purposes. For instances, the Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) pays farmers to take arable land out of production at the same time 
that the Bureau of Reclamation spends vast sums to make non-usable land arable.117  
Disadvantages of decentralization are basically the same as the advantages of 
centralization, especially when consistency is a critical element of the product or service 
being offered. This is especially germane in government services where unequal handling 
of an issue can be the source of lawsuits for “arbitrary and capricious” treatment or public 
outrage.118 Other disadvantages are that local innovations may not be shared throughout 
the enterprise and fragmentation resulting from employees identifying with the work unit 
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rather than the parent organization.119 This can lead to unnecessary duplication of effort 
or units working in direct opposition to one another. 
While much of the business press extolls the value of decentralization, and 
governments are being urged worldwide to decentralize their operations,120 
decentralization is not a remedy for all governance ills in all places. Government has 
some special characteristics that cause the best-sounding business strategy to run 
aground. 
The National Performance Review, issued in 1993 by then Vice President Al Gore 
was a top-to-bottom review of the performance of the federal government. The report ran 
to 174 pages and was broken down into four main sections: Cutting Red Tape, Putting 
Customers First, Empowering Employees to Get Results, and Cutting Back to Basics.121 
The main thrust of the section Empowering Employees dealt with decentralizing the 
federal bureaucracy and allowing employees at lower level of government, where most of 
the service is delivered, to make decisions and be less constricted by rules or have to wait 
less for instructions from supervisory levels above them. This strategy seems to fit in well 
with the previous goals of cutting red tape and putting the customer first. 
However, in a government bureaucracy, the consumers of the goods and services 
provided are often not the purchasers,122 thus distorting the typical market feedback loop. 
This can cause confusion as to the identity of the actual customer. Is the person receiving 
the service or the person paying for it the customer? These two will often have 
diametrically opposed views as to what constitutes good service. The end user may be 
looking for generosity while the taxpayer is looking for a tightly controlled, if not stingy, 
operation. 
Another layer that is added atop these customers is the political aspect of 
government bureaucracy. By making government agencies “consumer driven,”“ 
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assuming the customer is the end user of the product or service being offered, this places 
the driving force of government with the clients, rather than with the elected officials or 
the public law.123 Nothing in the NPR refers to a diminished oversight role for the 
politicians or the Senior Executive Staff (SES). Without organizational, policy, or 
strategic change, decentralization directives tends to cause more role ambiguity in 
managers than clarity of purpose.124 
B. STRATEGY AND CENTRALIZATION 
Kate and Gaibraith define organizational strategy as: 
Strategy is a company’s formula for success. It sets the organization’s 
direction and encompasses the company’s vision and mission, as well as 
its short and long-term goals. The strategy derives from the leadership’s 
understanding of the external factors (competitors, suppliers, customers, 
and emerging technologies) that bear on the firm, combined with their 
understanding of the strengths of the organization in relationship to those 
factors. The organization’s strategy is the cornerstone of the organization 
design process.125 
This definition describes what the strategy should look like and how it relates to its 
environment. As defined, the strategy is generic in the sense that most any manager in the 
enterprise would describe what she is doing as executing the strategy if she is performing 
the business of the organization. The conception and publication of the strategy would be 
the formulation stage, and the work done by the manager is the implementation part of 
the strategy. However, strategies can emerge unintentionally126 through mission creep, 
subtle external environmental changes, or other internal forces. Implementation can also 
move away from the strategy as originally formulated. It may be problematic to 
determine whether a change in structure or the work of the organization is an actual 
change of strategy or merely an adjustment to the original strategy.127 Studying strategies 
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becomes difficult because each strategy is a combination of mission, goals, and 
application of resources to reach objectives that are unique to the organization, thus 
making individual strategies difficult to quantify.128  
This difficulty became apparent following the formation of the DHS. The 
formation of this superagency, through combining 22 existing agencies that each had at 
least a superficial role in the still-evolving definition of the homeland security 
enterprise,129 reversed the adaptive cycle as described by Miles et al.130 Creators of the 
adaptive cycle posit that organizations that are newly formed, or existing ones that have 
recently gone through a major crisis, must realign themselves to the new circumstances 
and redefine their mission or “organizational domain.”131 This was not done in the case 
of the agencies of the DHS in that each agency pulled into it was expected to take on 
new, additional missions in homeland security as an added responsibility without 
sacrificing its previous missions and without significant new resources to do so.132 This 
lack of a new focus along with new resources demonstrates that the “entrepreneurial 
problem” was not addressed in the reorganization of the affected agencies. This failure to 
adjust the focus and resourcing of the new organization had cascade effects through the 
rest of the adaptive cycle. For instance, the thrust of addressing the “engineering 
problem” “involves the creation of a system which operationalizes management’s 
solution to the entrepreneurial problem.”133 Without redirecting of the legacy 
organization to a new fundamental mission, the adaptive cycle is broken. The third leg of 
the adaptive cycle, the administrative problem, is the point where the organizational 
structures are adjusted and fine-tuned to move smoothly from the existing mission to the 
newly articulated one;134 however, the top-directed rapid consolidation of the legacy 
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agencies to one corporate entity left scant opportunity to rationalize and articulate a new 
unified mission for all the elements of the new organization.135 
In attempting to address the problems inherent in the adaptive cycle, Miles et al. 
applied typologies to strategies based on how the organization went about achieving their 
mission, as compared to other organizations in the same industries.136 This framework 
has been repeatedly tested against various types of organizations in the public and private 
sector and, with some modifications, is still used in the analysis of organizational 
strategy. Although the typologies have been described as more descriptive than 
prescriptive,137 they are still used to identify sets of characteristics that are stable and 
valid enough that organizations can be categorized along a continuum of strategy types 
by using a number of instruments. Generalizations can be made about how organizations 
that have taken on a certain strategic type can be expected to perform in a particular 
environment.138 
For instance, prospectors are expected to perform better than other strategies 
when facing a turbulent environment. This stands to reason as prospectors are always 
looking for disruptive technologies or practices in order to gain a first advantage. If 
prospectors can help to create the disruptive environment, so much the better. Defenders 
tend to outperform others in stable environments. Stable environments with established 
markets give the defender time to hone their product or efficiencies and develop deeper 
relationships with customers. In contrast to prospectors and defenders, who have clear 
sets of priorities and methods, reactors lurch from one tactic to another in response to 
whichever environmental pressure seems the most important or pressing at the time.  
Reactors do not capitalize on the set of capabilities that they have built up, 
but rather shift strategic orientation in reaction to competitive pressures, 
thus they will usually be at a disadvantage to those firms that are 
competing from an established position of strength.139 
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The last of Miles et al.’s strategic types are the analyzers. Analyzers fill the gap 
between the prospectors and the defenders, in that they are rarely disrupters, but they 
carefully watch the environment and will attempt to be a close second in the market. This 
reduces the risk of putting large amounts of resources into products or services that may 
never establish themselves in the market. A motto that may be appropriate for analyzers 
is, “The early bird may get the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese.” This has 
implications in the homeland security field. If a homeland security entity waits for 
outside forces to take the initiative in developing disruptive technologies or application of 
terrorist techniques, it will be forever in a response mode rather than a predictive and 
preventative posture. As in the case of the 9/11 attacks, waiting to see what the adversary 
is going to do before developing countermeasures is unacceptable. Because all 
organizations do exhibit some level of response to the environment and may be a leader 
in one circumstance and more defensive in another, analyzers are not considered a unique 
typology among some researchers.140 
Miles et al. first published their theory on the four strategic typologies in 1978. 
The paper was based on scant existing research and data from studying only four 
industries (academic book publishing, electronics, food processing, and public 
hospitals).141 The theoretical framework that was developed in this first study was tested 
in 2004 across 709 companies in three countries142 in order to check the theory that 
certain strategies will perform better when coupled with certain favorable environmental 
conditions. The study by DeSarbo et al. found that firms in all of the industries in all of 
the countries used mixed strategies, but each tended toward one of the generic 
typologies.143 Furthermore, the use of specific typologies predicted more success in 
industries and environments favorable to that strategy. In general, a prospector strategy 
outperformed other strategies in fast developing fields, such as electronics, where 
innovation was driving the industry. Defenders did better than other strategies in fields 
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that stressed marketing, customer development, and management skills such as finance 
and human resources.144  
Just as environments that are stable or proceeding at a measured, incremental pace 
favor a defender type of strategy, this environment also tends to favor a more centralized 
style of decision making. This pattern is repeated with the more uncertain, fast-moving 
prospector atmosphere. The only cases in which reactor strategies were able to execute on 
a par, or even exceed the performance of any of the other strategic types, is in the case of 
a highly government-regulated industry—in this case the airline industry in 1980.145  
Strategy alignment is key to organizational success and proper level of 
centralization is part of having the right strategy. The generalized finding that correctly 
matching strategic type to the industry environment predicts relative performance was 
validated by a meta-study done in 1997 that analyzed the results of 40 empirical studies. 
These studies examined multiple organizations using both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal methods over a period of up to 28 years.146 The analysis scanned for 
differences of whether inductive versus deductive conclusions would differ, with an 
expectation that inductive conclusions would show a stronger correlation to performance 
than deductive. The analysis found that approximately 28 percent of performance 
differences could be accounted for based solely on strategic alignment, with no difference 
between inductively versus deductively derived conclusions.147 These results make a 
strong case for the efficacy of the typology theory of Miles et al. and the value realized in 
properly aligning organizational goals with the proper strategy. 
The public sector is no different than the private in its need to emphasize 
customer service, attract and retain good personnel, and demonstrate effective service. 
The recommendations of the National Performance Review mirror are widely considered 
to be best business practices. The chapter titles of the recommendations in the NPR are: 
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Cutting Red Tape, Putting Customers First, Empowering Employees to Get Results, and 
Cutting Back to Basics. A card that was distributed to managers after the rollout of the 
NPR sums up the thrust of the report. The card contained the following: 
Ask yourself: 
• Is it good for my customers? 
• Is it legal and ethical? 
• Is it something that I am willing to be accountable for? 
• Is it consistent with my agency’s mission? 
• Am I using my time wisely? 
• Is the answer to YES to all these questions? 
• If so, don’t ask permission. You already have it. Just do it!148 
This checklist presents a simple way to allow managers to cut through layers of 
formalization and make decisions based on the facts in front of her, rather than adhering 
to a rule that was either formulated to take in all contingencies or was written in response 
to an unanticipated circumstance years before. Read in the context of the NPR, that is the 
executive intent—to allow managers to make decisions. However, in running down 
through the list, in the context of work in the federal government, it would be reasonable 
for the manager to still have questions about the intent and consequences that she may 
face if she guesses wrong. The first question that could come to mind may be who the 
customer actually is. 
For outward-facing agencies, such as the Social Security Administration or the 
Internal Revenue Service, it is clear who the customers are. The customers are the 
citizens that utilize the services provided by these agencies. Agencies that provide 
services or funding to other agencies or jurisdictions, such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency or the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), have a 
largely outward-facing orientation and can also readily identify their customers. 
However, some agencies in DHS, such as the Coast Guard, have missions that are split 
between inward and outward orientations. In the case of the Coast Guard, literal 
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interpretation of this checklist could lead to mission creep or loss of mission focus. After 
9/11, the Coast Guard was given the additional duties of terrorist interdiction along the 
longest coastlines and river systems in the world with no suggestion that it cut back on its 
prior missions of protecting fisheries from illegal activities, pollution control, drug 
interdiction, or assisting distressed boaters.149 Under the above guidelines, frontline 
employees could justify nearly any activity as falling under the Coast Guard’s mission 
without actually adding any value to the enterprise. 
Investigative agencies, such as the FBI, have a combination of inside and outside 
customers in that it works directly with and for both private citizens and industry and 
government. Intelligence agencies have an inward-focus and their customers are, for the 
most part, their bosses. While it is generally a good idea to please one’s superiors, the 
items on the “empowerment list” were clearly not written for inward-facing 
organizations.  
As far as legal and ethical, if a rule is being broken or overridden, will that in fact 
be considered legal or ethical? If there is any question, the “reasonable person” doctrine 
with all its attendant vagaries, will most likely be used to evaluate the decision. This 
uncertainty may be enough to make the manager unwilling to be held accountable if she 
has no reasonable way of knowing how the decision will be judged or what the 
accountability will look like. 
The other questions in the list may not be as fraught as the ones at the top of the 
list, but still put the manager in the position of having her judgment questioned with 
unknown consequences. For any manager that is unsure of the level of commitment that 
her supervisor has for the decentralization effort, the safest path is to always defer to the 
policy manual. 
At least as far back as 1947, with President Truman’s establishment of the first 
Hoover Commission, efforts to decentralize what was considered a monolithic federal 
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government have met with limited and short-lived success.150 This has been attributed to 
intense centralizing pressures151 from politicians as well as upper managers, and no 
corresponding demand for less formalization from lower level bureaucrats. 
Applying a blanket prescription to agencies to decentralize their decision making 
and unleash the creative power of the workers has a serious flaw if the work of the social 
scientists studying organizational effectiveness is taken seriously. Study after study 
shows that peak performance is linked to having a strategic typology that matches the 
environment. Again, using the P-A-D-R typology of Miles et al., organizations that are 
operating in a stable environment are better served by a defender strategy, and defender 
strategies are best served by centralized decision making. This is not to say that there is 
no place for decentralization in government or that the level of formalization is optimal. 
However, an early appraisal of the effectiveness of the NPR that was done at the close of 
the Clinton administration found only spotty successes and, while not commenting on the 
value or suitability of the proposed changes, concluded that the changes would have been 
better received if the implementation strategy had more closely aligned with the changes 
that were being attempted.152 
In a large agency, it can be expected that different levels of the organization will 
be exposed to different environments that present different pressures and opportunities. 
This can lead to organizations having a good environmental fit but a poor internal fit. If 
this occurs, it can be expected to send shock waves up through the organization and 
threaten political discord.153 This conflict between corporate strategy and level of 
centralization may occur in agencies that are stratified between a stable administrative 
core and lower layers that deal in volatile environments such as occurs in criminal 
investigation or in disaster response. An example of where tight coupling would be a 
                                                 
150 William Pemberton, “Hoover and Truman: Truman and the Hoover Commission,” Truman 
Library, 1991, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/hoover/commission.htm.  
151 Pfiffner, “The National Performance Review in Perspective,” 62.  
152 Thompson, “Reinvention as Reform,” 509.  
153 Danny Miller, “Environmental Fit versus Internal Fit,” Organization Science 3, no. 2 (1992): 160–
161.    
 57 
problem is in agencies that are expected to stay ahead of developing trends, such as 
terrorism or cybercrime.  
A famous example was exposed during the post 9/11 investigation when it was 
revealed that Phoenix FBI agent Kenneth Williams had warned of possible terrorists 
taking flight lessons in order to hijack planes, but he was not given the authority to follow 
up with an investigation.154 Likewise, intelligence coming out of the Minneapolis office 
of the FBI was dismissed at headquarters as insufficient to gather warrants when agents 
had zeroed in on al-Quaeda operative Zacarias Moussaoui.155 While it may be tempting 
to ascribe these failures strictly to individual myopia, these types of errors are an 
expected outcome in organizations that pursue a centralized defender strategy while 
operating in an uncertain and changing environment that is better suited to a loosely 
coupled prospector strategy. 
Another example of the consequences of over-centralizing field operations 
occurred during the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. Detailed plans had been drawn 
up by DHS in the form of the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). These plans contained expectations for the actions of all 
levels of responders to a catastrophe from the local through the federal level and included 
the private sector; however, these detailed plans were not well understood at all levels 
and were detailed past the understanding of many of the responders at all levels.156 In 
fact, the plans were so detailed and divorced from any kind of a ground reality that “From 
the time a request is initiated until the military force or capability is delivered to the 
disaster site requires a 21-step process.”157 Even though it may seem that there was a 
complete decoupling of FEMA from the ground forces initially on the ground after 
Katrina hit, this is again an example of extreme centralization of process when it is 
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inappropriately applied to the poorly understood and constantly changing environment of 
a catastrophic event. 
It should not be surprising that elaborate top-down planning in organizations that 
deal with unsettled environments at the point of service delivery tend to deal more with 
accountability issues than with operational imperatives. According to Kettl, when 
approaching new or increasingly complex problems, “Instead of seeking new strategies to 
enhance horizontal collaboration, the instinct for restructuring often creates new vertical 
lines that only increase the complexity of creating a seamless service system.”158 Kettl 
attributes this to the fact that the political structure of the organization is at least as 
important as the operational needs.159  
Like many socio-organizational questions, the optimal level of centralization in an 
organization cannot be examined in isolation. Power structures, political accountability, 
strategic goals, culture, and the effects on the people in the organization all have to be 
considered. The research and literature on centralization in homeland security has been 
mostly confined to the upper levels of agencies and their relationships with political 
governance. Little has been written about the specific effects of centralization on the 
homeland security enterprise at the lower levels where the service is provided. The 
dynamic nature of evolving terrorist threats and the increased reliance on the complex 
infrastructures that are newly at risk from natural and manmade disasters would seem to 
call out for new approaches to protection; however, the organizations and systems to deal 
with these threats are largely legacy constructs. 
An issue quite aside from the efficacy of an optimized level of centralization is 
that changes in levels of authority and power necessarily come at the expense of another 
manager in the organization. If the managers cannot alter these power dynamics charged 
with optimizing the level of centralization then the effort to improve faces an immense 
obstacle. 
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The term “benefit,” in the following text, is in the sense that the enterprise can be 
expected to function better if the proper level of centralization is realized, other factors 
being equal. The benefits and disadvantages of centralization of decision making are well 
documented. Centralized organizations have the advantage of stability, good 
accountability, little duplication of effort, and equality of results across time and distance. 
These benefits do come at the expense of speed, flexibility, and innovation. Another 
danger of centralization is that the decision maker who wields ultimate authority may be 
feckless or unwilling to make decisions. Decentralized organizations are in general faster, 
more dynamic, flexible, and innovative. The downside is the need for closer supervision, 
duplication, and a lack of even outcomes over the entire enterprise. However, a manager 
or policymaker cannot just look at the list of advantages and disadvantages and choose a 
level of decentralization that fits most closely with her vision of how she would like to 
see the organization operate. If the level of centralization is an ill fit for the strategy that 
the organization is following, the results will almost invariably be suboptimal. There is 
more to the optimal centralization story than just concentrating power either further up or 
further down in an organization. The decision to centralize or decentralize decision 
making and other authorities in an organization is not a standalone decision. The decision 
to centralize decision making should be in alignment with the strategy the enterprise 
pursues to achieve its goals. Organizations that operate in a fast-paced or uncertain 
environment should adopt a strategy of constant change and experimentation. This 
strategy requires that employees have the ability to make decisions and commit resources 
at an appropriate level quickly in order to either take advantage of opportunities or cut 
losses if the environment suddenly turns unfavorable. Rivals or events will overtake a 
slow-moving bureaucracy in this kind of environment. In the public domain, even if the 
market that the organization operates in is protected, performance will be less in a system 
in which either the level of centralization does not match the strategy, or the organization 
is in a constantly reactive mode rather than focusing on a predetermined strategic mode. 
When determining the appropriate strategy for an SBU to pursue, it must be 
realized that large organizations are not monolithic. The environment at the top of a large 
federal bureaucracy is not the same as that at the bottom. Therefore, it is possible that the 
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lower levels of an organization that is exposed to more uncertainty can have more 
freedom of action and decentralization than higher levels in the same organization. The 
inverse of this situation can also be true. If a defender organization is undergoing 
reorganization at the higher levels of the organization, the lower levels can still perform 
in a stable, formalized manner as before.  
Absent a good match between the strategy and environment, organizations can 
still be successful if they have properly matched their level of centralization with their 
strategies. The exception to this is in the case of a reactor strategy. In the case of a reactor 
strategy, there is little that the organization can do to improve other than attempt to adopt 
a better strategic posture. However, this may not always be possible if upper levels of the 
organization exhibit dysfunction or are unwilling or unable to commit to a strategic focus. 
The fact that an organization may not readily identify its strategy makes the 
matching of centralization to strategy problematic. Academics assign strategic type based 
on a number of methodologies and subsequent statistical analysis. However, if form can 
be expected to follow function, then an organization that sees the value of decentralizing 
decision making for the reasons of speed and flexibility is probably pursuing the better 
part of a prospector strategy. If the overarching goals of the organization are to ensure 
accountability and equity at the expense of speed and flexibility, then formalization and a 
defender strategy presents a natural choice. 
By identifying the amount of formalization and policy-driven decision making 
that an organization uses to perform its everyday mission, an organization can assess 
level of centralization at different levels of the organization. Mapping the business 
processes and analyzing the levels of the decision points can do this.160 If most routine 
decisions are driven by policy, and there is little scope for overriding the policy, this is 
indicative of a very centralized process. If frontline employees have broad authority to 
make policy decisions or to override existing policy, this would indicate a very 
decentralized organization. An extreme example of this would be Nordstrom’s famous 
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employee handbook that resides on a single card that is given to every employee at hire 
that says simply, “Use your good judgment in all situations.”161 
C. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis has sought to identify those practices that help identify the optimum 
level of centralization of decision making in government organizations, and in particular, 
organizations engaged in homeland security activities. Having the proper level of 
centralization allows for a balance of speed and innovation while preserving 
accountability. These are all critical components of a successful homeland security effort; 
however, it was found in the research that centralization of decision making is not a 
choice that can be made formulaically. Centralization must be matched to the strategy 
pursued by the organization, and the strategy must be aligned with the operating 
environment.  
When assessing the issue of the optimal level of centralization in an organization, 
two primary conditions must be considered: the level of instability in the environment 
that the organization is operating in and the strategic architecture that is being used to 
pursue the organization’s goals. Different strategies perform better when matched to the 
environments, and each of the strategies calls for different levels of centralization and 
formalization. 
This question holds value to homeland security because the organizations 
comprising the enterprise address threats that are constantly evolving. This dynamism 
mirrors the research literature’s definition of a turbulent environment. Turbulent 
environments are best met by using a prospector strategy. Organizations using a 
prospector strategy, which values speed and innovation, are recommended to use a 
decentralized model of decision making as much as possible.162  
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The administrative design of prospector organizations emphasize forward 
thinking and positioning themselves to be on the leading edge of emerging trends. They 
also tend to deemphasize formalization in the form of extensive rules and policies that 
must be consulted and adhered to before a decision can be made. While pushing 
decisions down to the lowest level of the organization is not always warranted or wise, 
these organizations do tend to use a more collaborative decision-making process than 
more formalized defender organizations.163 Centralization of decision making works well 
in situations that are largely routine, or in circumstances where control, equity, or 
procedural justice is more important than speed or innovation and in critical situations 
with dire consequences if poor decisions are made lower in the organization.  
The researchers using a variety of methods strategically typed organizations that 
were studied by the authors of the research papers that were used as a basis of this thesis. 
Organizations have been classified by distributing simple questionnaires to managers in 
the firms, using measurable indicators, researcher inference, and measurable criteria 
when available.164 The strategic typology was then applied based on statistical analysis of 
the answers. Several of the researchers also made a point of questioning different levels 
of the organization because they found that different levels had different views of how 
the organization operated. This brings two factors to the foreground when applying this 
research to existing organizations.  
First, the organizations cannot be expected to know what typology would be 
applied to them. The managers in the organization know the organization’s goals, type of 
environment they work in, how they operate within the bounds of their culture, and can 
usually articulate a strategy for reaching goals. However, strategies and strategic types 
are not the same. The strategic typologies are ascribed to already functioning enterprises. 
The typologies are used to classify a pattern of work practices and are not goals in and of 
themselves. The typology is only valuable as a group of practices that lead to predictable 
outcomes in a given set of circumstances. 
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Second, the fact that researchers commonly found significant differences in the 
attitudes and expectations of managers at different levels in the organizations studied 
indicates that different levels in the organization are operating in different environments, 
or at least the perception of different environments. This fact may have an impact on the 
strategic operation of the organization.165 Disconnected perceptions of the strategic 
environment have implications when suggesting a strategic type to the organization and 
the best level of centralization. A mid-level or regional manager may have a great deal of 
freedom to make decisions and use resources without consulting headquarters and feel 
the organization has a high level of decentralization. If that manager does not extend any 
of that authority to the levels below her, she would thus be presiding over very 
centralized and formalized units. In a loosely coupled organization wherein the different 
layers of the hierarchy do not have close interdependencies, differing views of the 
operating environment may be acceptable or at least not debilitating;166 however, loose 
coupling comes with the risk of organizational inconsistency.167 
Another reason that different layers within an organization may have differing 
views of the strategy pursued by the enterprise is the administrative distance between 
policy formulation and implementation. Walker and Enticott found that service managers 
who were responsible for implementing policies had a much more nuanced view of the 
operations of the organization than corporate officers who were closer to the political 
operatives.168 This is significant when assessing an organization through self-typing use 
of questionnaires or paragraph identification.169 Examination of multiple layers of the 
organization is essential to not only get a more complete view of the operation, but it also 
better prepares the managers in the organization to accept results that may clash with 
their own assessment of the larger organization.  
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In order to allow managers to evaluate their organization’s actual implemented 
strategic typology, a standardized program should be developed that can be administered 
to members at different levels of the hierarchy that mirrors procedural and attitudinal 
dimensions within the SBU. Tools, such as Malcolm McPherson’s Strategic Capability 
Survey Questionnaire, have been used successfully in various public and private 
industries.170 If currently prepared survey tools prove to be inadequate or ill suited to 
homeland security organizations, such tools should be developed and validated. The 
results of the survey should then be statistically evaluated to determine the mix of 
typologies that are being used in that SBU. Only once the strategy being pursued to 
achieve organizational goals is realized can the proper level of centralization be 
determined. 
Determining the proper level of centralization in an organization is has been 
extensively researched and is a common topic of discourse in the literature. Pairing the 
level of centralization to a successful strategy is less studied, and it is largely, but not 
exclusively, focused on the private sector. The public sector offers limited opportunities 
to conduct either cross sectional or longitudinal studies, as most government services 
operate as monopolies and thus offer limited chances to compare across different 
methodologies. Another difficulty in assessing efficacy in government is the lack of 
broad, baseline metrics. This is especially true in homeland security fields that work only 
sporadically in the case of one-off large-scale natural disasters or the prevention of rare 
terrorist attacks. Prevention is a notoriously difficult service to directly measure and is 
best approached by assessing the processes that make up the prevention effort.171  
The Clinton administration’s NPR emphasized decentralization of decision 
making as a key element in streamlining governmental processes and minimizing the 
delays in getting services or answers from government officials. Other benefits based on 
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strategy and environments go unaddressed in the NPR.172 Specifically, decentralizing 
lower levels of certain homeland security that operate in turbulent environments can 
benefit from a decentralized philosophy coupled with a Prospector strategic thrust.  
The DHS was born as the result of a centralized, top-down process and is not 
going to be set free of multilayered congressional oversight. The opportunity for more 
decentralization and innovation lies at the operational level of homeland security 
agencies. The benefits of decentralization are that the employees that are on the front 
lines of preventing terrorism and crime are most familiar with the problems and possible 
solutions. They are the ones managing and delivering services during national 
emergencies and need the ability to act and react to changing circumstances and 
opportunities that may well pass before permission can be gained in a strict hierarchy. 
This freedom does come at the cost of less control, and the risk of duplication of effort; 
however, duplication is seen as a defense in depth in high reliability organizations.173 
The price of duplication may well be worth accepting in order to gain the level of 
innovation that comes with more and disparate people working on the same problem. 
From an organizational culture standpoint, it has been demonstrated that it is 
easier to convert employees from a centralized culture to a decentralized one than vice 
versa. The other cultural challenge is the loosening of the coupling between the 
operational and administrative layers of the agencies. As previously noted, the risk of 
inconsistency comes with loosening the control between layers of the organization. Given 
the unlikeliness of the administrative core of these agencies being decentralized, 
loosening the coupling between layers the hierarchy may be the only viable alternative to 
allow organizations to benefit from a decentralized decision-making process in support of 
an innovative prospector-like strategic stance. 
However, given the high stakes that are placed on homeland security being as 
airtight as possible, these changes must be phased in under controlled circumstances so 
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that the effects can be monitored and adjustments made as problems arise. This action 
would amount to a purposeful application of the goals set out in the NPR in 1993.  
In a speech to the American Bar Association in 2011, Deputy Secretary of 
Homeland Security, Jane Holl Lute, said, “National security is centralized, it’s top-
driven. Homeland security is operational, it’s transactional, it’s decentralized, it’s bottom 
driven.”174 This statement succinctly identifies the differences between policies that are 
put into place to protect the nation from the large, organized international threats that the 
Unites States faces from nations that oppose us. In the homeland security field, the threat 
is diverse, smaller, and at the ground level. This evolving and diversified threat meets the 
environmental description of those organizations that excel by using a prospector-type 
strategy that is decentralized at the operational levels of the enterprise.  
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